province, in which it is sovereign and supreme. A thousand errors have arisen from imagining that the conscience should give account of itself to the understanding, and that the understanding should give account of itself to the conscience. Each has its own sphere, and cannot in that sphere interfere with or clash with the other. While independent in themselves, they must, however, as residing in the same mind, and frequently judging of different qualities of the same concrete object, have multiplied points of affinity.

The conscience may be profitably viewed under three aspects:—

FIRST, AS PROCEEDING UPON AND REVEALING A LAW WITH AUTHORITATIVE OBLIGATIONS. Every intuitive principle in our constitution has its special truth to reveal and sanction, and this is to be ascertained by a careful induction of its individual exercises. What then does the moral power in man say, when we accurately interpret its dicta ? This seems to be its peculiarity, that it declares what ought and what ought not to be. This is its very nature and function, to point to, and announce a law demanding obedience. In this respect it is a faculty *sui generis,* different from every other principle of the mind. It is not a law merely in the sense in which the fundamental principles at the basis of the intellectual powers are laws, but in a peculiar sense applicable to nothing else. Its office is to declare not what is, but what ought to be. Its mood is not the indicative, like the reason, nor the conditional, like the understanding, nor the optative, like the will, but the imperative. Other powers approve of truth, but this of virtue ; others guard us from error, but this from crime. It sits on a throne like a king, its rules are obligations, its affirmations are statutes, its proclamations are enactments. It sits in judgment as a judicature, and its decisions are commands, its sentences are condemnations, its smiles are rewards, and its frowns are reproofs. It

asserts not power, but claims, which affirm their superiority to power. It sets forth not might but right, which in its nature is above might. It often says of what is, that it should not be, and of what is not, that it should be. It frequently lends its countenance to what is most despised among mankind, and pronounces a sentence of disapproval on that which is most highly esteemed. It is not afraid to attack power in high places, while it will espouse and defend the cause of the persecuted and the helpless.